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1 Introduction
This paper is about the protability of mergers between rms producing di¤erentiated products,
and in a context where governments intervene to a¤ect the competitiveness of their rms in
international markets. An example that is often cited as a classic case for interventionist trade
policy is the aircraft industry. Indeed, the U.S.-E.U. civil aircraft dispute concerning government
support for (respectively) Boeing and Airbus with both parties accusing each other of illegal and
hidden export subsidies  is certainly one of the longest-running GATT/WTO dispute. At the
same time, this duopoly in the market is the consequence of mergers within this specic industry.
Airbus was formally created in 1970 and began as a consortium of European aerospace rms,
whereas the American Boing took over its major competitor McDonnell Douglas in 1997. Another
evidence of mergers in specic industries with active governments is given by the merger wave in
the automotive industry in China, the worlds largest automobile producer ahead of the United
States. For example, Shanghai Automotive Industry Group (SAIC) acquired in 2007 Nanjing
Automotive Group (NAC), and became the largest manufacturer in China with a consolidated
annual production of 2.7 million units of vehicles.1 This industry and the competition in export
markets are also the subject of ongoing disputes between countries. For example, the Obama
administration led in September 2012 a trade case at the WTO against China, alleging that it
has provided auto companies with at least $1 billion in illegal export subsidies between 2009 and
2011.2 Finally, one can also mention the merger wave in the agricultural industry in the US or
in the EU3, bearing in mind that in both the US and the EU, the main export subsidy program
is targeted to farm products i.e. the Export Enhancement Program (EEP) in the US and the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in Europe.4
In this paper, we thus construct a very simple model to analyze whether mergers are protable
1See, e.g., Market Analysis Report: Chinas Automotive Industry, prepared for Israel Export & International
Cooperation Institute, November 2010.
2See, e.g., The New York Times, September 17, 2012.
3See, e.g., the Report on competition law enforcement and market monitoring activities by European competition
authorities in the food sector, by the European Competition Network (ECN) Subgroup Food (May 2012), for a
summary of antitrust cases in the food sector in Europe. For a brief summary of the merger waves in agricultural
cooperatives in the US, see e.g. Hudson and Herndon (2000).
4For a comparison between US and EU agricultural policies see, e.g., A. Schmitz and T.G. Schmitz (2010).
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or not in a strategic trade policy environment. More specically, we consider a model with
linear demand and costs, and with two rms in one country that are candidates to the merger
and one rm in another country. All rms are assumed to compete in a third-country market.
Furthermore, each rm produces a single product which is an imperfect substitute to the products
of the other rms. In this context, we investigate optimal strategic trade policies under both
Cournot and Bertrand competition, and in turn analyze the protability of the domestic merger
from each country welfare perspective.
Since governments act rst and set their trade policies anticipating the behavior of both
domestic and foreign rms, each countrys trade policy can be viewed as a mean to induce
domestic rms in case there are many to act as if they were a single rm. In other words, one
might view trade policy as a substitute to merger(s). But, as it will be clear in this article, this is
not the case. Indeed, a merger in one country changes the strategic interaction in the market in
that it modies the slope of the joint best-response function of the merging rms, and thus the
behavior of all rms. This in turn modies the strategic interaction between governments and so
the best-response functions of both governments in the policy game. So, while the formal model
is as simple as possible, the careful analysis of the impact of a merger on the interplay between
the strategic interactions at the rm level and at the government level proved to be not as simple
as one might have thought.
The results about the protability of mergers in a strategic trade policy environment also
di¤er signicantly from those in a laisser-faire economy. In this latter case, it is generally felt that
mergers give rise to a strategic advantage given to outsiders that may harm the rms involved in
the merger. This is the so-called the merger paradoxidentied by Salant, Switzer and Reynolds
(1983). They indeed show  in the linear demand model with constant marginal costs and
homogenous products that mergers are not benecial to the participating rms unless more than
80% of them collude. Still in the linear Cournot model but with the more realistic assumption
of di¤erentiated products, Lommerud and Sørgard (1997) nd that a merger of two rms can
be benecial to them, provided products are not close substitutes.5 In a strategic trade policy
5Mergers can also be protable if Cournot competition is extended to include cost synergies (see, e.g., Perry
and Porter, 1985), demand convexities (see, e.g., Faulí-Oller, 1997) or union-rm bargaining (see, e.g., Lommerud,
Straume and Sørgard, 2008).
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environment, we nd that a domestic merger is always protable to the host country irrespective
of the degree of product di¤erentiation. Furthermore, the merger can also be benecial to the
other country if product diversity is large enough. Under Bertrand competition, the classic result
is that mergers are always benecial to the merging parties and even more so to the outsider(s)
(Deneckere and Davidson, 1985). When strategic trade policy is used, the merger benets to both
countries independently of the product range rivalry, but it benets more to the country in which
the merger occurs than to the other country. Overall our ndings thus suggest that the persistence
of strategic trade policies including (hidden) export subsidies can be a driving force behind
the merger process since in most cases it benets the host country and the competing country as
well. In other words, interventionist trade policies might lead to industrial concentration, and to
the detriment of consumers in export markets.
The question addressed in this paper is linked with both the literature on trade policy un-
der imperfect competition in world markets and that on the protability of mergers. Dixit
(1984) analyzes separately import tari¤s, export subsidies as well anti-trust policies in a general
"reciprocal-markets" model where several rms in two countries compete in both markets. In
particular, he shows that forming export (import) cartels as reected by a decrease in the ex-
ogenous number of rms will be welfare enhancing (decreasing). Richardson (1999) and Horn
and Levinsohn (2001) take a step towards and investigate situations where governments use both
trade and competition policies, this last being reected by the choice of market concentration.
Richardson (1999) shows that trade liberalization leads to a tightening of the competition poli-
cies, while Horn and Levinsohn (2001) in a more general context show that this is not necessarily
the case.
Our paper is most closely related to the work done by Huck and Konrad (2004). Following the
standard literature on trade policies under oligopoly and unlike the above mentioned analysis
they work with a two-stage model including two levels of strategic interactions: one between
governments in the rst stage, and the other between rms in the second stage. In a linear Cournot
framework with several countries and rms producing a homogenous good at constant marginal
cost, they investigate the protability of domestic and international mergers. With prot being
the objective function of the decision-makers in the rst stage, they show that the results of Salant
et al. (1983) are reversed for national mergers in that mergers can be benecial to participating
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rms but harm competitors in other countries but not for international mergers. We assume just
two countries and three rms but analyze the protability of a domestic merger when products
are not perfect substitutes so that in contrast to Huck and Konrad none of the merging rm
is closed down. Furthermore, welfare not prot is the objective function of governments since
they can supplement their strategic trade policies through lump-sum transfers to the rms for
example to balance the governments budget without a¤ecting their behaviors. Under Cournot
competition, we then show that a national merger is always protable to the host country, and
can also be protable to the competing country if products are not close substitutes. Unlike Huck
and Konrad, we also investigate the case of Bertrand competition, and show that it reinforces
the protability of a domestic merger in that the two countries benet from it independently of
the product range rivalry. Huck and Konrad, though, develop a model with n rms located in k
countries and also examine the protability of international mergers.
The rest of the paper is set up as follows. We rst analyze Cournot competition in Section
II and then investigate the case of Bertrand competition in Section III. Section IV o¤ers a brief
conclusion. Finally, the di¤erent computations of the changes in each countrys welfare due to
the merger are gathered in the Appendix.
2 Cournot Competition
2.1 The basic framework
We consider a model with two countries, 1 and 2, and three rms A, B and C. Firm A is located
and owned by the inhabitants of country 1, while rms B and C are located and owned by the
inhabitants of country 2. In line with the literature on strategic trade policy, we assume that the
three rms sell their products exclusively in a third-country market. We also assume that entry is
prohibitively costly which can be justied by assuming that rm-specic xed costs are su¢ ciently
high to make entry on export markets unprotable. Finally, as in Eaton and Grossman (1986),
each government places equal weigh on the prot of the domestic rm(s) and on tax revenues
(or subsidy costs) in evaluating social welfare. Its objective is therefore to maximize national
product.
We have the following two-stage game. In the rst stage, the government of each country
decides independently of the other about the subsidy (or tax) per unit of production or export.
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In the second stage, rms compete either in quantities (à la Cournot) or in prices (à la Bertrand).
The crucial feature of this article is that each rm produces a single product which is an imperfect
substitute or complement for the output of its rivals, or partner in case of a merger. In other
words, if there is a national merger in country 2, the two merging rms still produce two varieties
after the merger6. Finally, each rm produces at a constant marginal cost normalized to 0.
We start by analyzing the case of Cournot competition. The inverse demand function for
product i, for i = A;B;C, is linear and is given by
pi (q) = 1  qi   q i; (1)
where q  (qA; qB; qC), and where q i is the sum of output levels excluding output of rm i. The
parameter  2 (0; 1) captures the degree of substitutability between any two goods.
The prot of rm i located in country j thus receiving the subsidy sj is thus given by
i = qi(1  qi   q i + sj): (2)
Welfare in country 1 is given by W1 = A   s1qA, or
W1 = qApA (q) : (3)
Welfare in country 2 is given by W2 = B + C   s2(qB + qC), or
W2 = qBpB (q) + qCpC (q) : (4)
Subsidy payments net out in the equation determining a countrys welfare.
We stress that following a merger we will focus exclusively on the change in each countrys
welfare, thus leaving aside the change in (joint) prots. The reason is the following. Each country
could supplement its strategic trade policy through lump-sum (positive or negative) transfers to
the rms, in particular to balance the governments budget. These transfers do not show up in
the model because they do not a¤ect rmsbehaviors and so do not interfere with the strategic
aspects of countriespolicies. Therefore, when analyzing the protability of a merger, attention
6This can be endogenized by assuming that there is a xed non-sunk cost of marketing a brand, and that this
xed cost has intermediate values. It cannot be too high otherwise the merged rm will withdraw a brand, and
it cannot be too small otherwise the outsider will introduce a new brand in the post-merger situation. For details,
see Lommerud and Sørgard (1997).
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must be given to the change in total welfare in each country. In other words, analyzing the change
in (joint) prots only (as dened in (2)) is not relevant in the present framework with government
intervention because prots can be a¤ected by the lump-sum transfers. And these transfers can
be di¤erentiated according to whether a merger occurs or not, which would be the case if the
governments budget needed to be balanced.
2.2 The NoMerger Case
The best response of rm i located in country j to the output level q i is given by r
C(N)
i (q i; sj) =
max f0; (1 + sj   q i) =2g, where the subscript C(N) denotes Cournot competition in the No-
merger case. In the absence of regulation  i.e. s1 = s2 = 0 the Cournot equilibrium with
product di¤erentiation yields qi = 1=(2 + 2) for i = A;B;C. This leads to the following
equilibrium prots (and welfare) i = 1=(2 + 2)
2 for i = A;B;C.
Given a couple of subsidies s  (s1; s2) 6= (0; 0), the equilibrium quantities in the second stage
of the game in the absence of a merger are given by
q
C(N)
A (s) =
(2  ) + (2 + )s1   2s2
2(2 +    2) ;
q
C(N)
j (s) =
(2  ) + 2s2   s1
2(2 +    2) ; j = B;C: (5)
Substituting into (1), (3) and (4) and calculating the rst-order conditions for maximizing W1
with respect to s1 and W2 with respect to s2, yields the following governmentsbest-response
functions in subsidies
R
C(N)
1 (s2) =
2 [(2  )  2s2]
(2 + )(2 +    22) ;
R
C(N)
2 (s1) =
(1  ) [s1   (2  )]
4(1 +    2) : (6)
The best-response function of country 1 is downward sloping as it is typically the case in a
Cournot oligopoly model of international trade à la Brander and Spencer (1985). In contrast the
best-response function of country 2 is upward sloping. The explanation is the following. Suppose
that country 1 increases its subsidy by ds1. Then, the rm located in country 1 increases its
production level while each rm located in country 2 decreases its production level (see eq. (5)).
The key point is that the two rms of country 2 act independently of each other in the oligopoly
game. Therefore, in order to induce the rms to take into account the positive spillover of a
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decrease in ones own production on one partners marginal prot, country 2 best reacts to an
increase in subsidy in country 1 by increasing its own subsidy.
Solving this system of best-response functions, we obtain the following equilibrium subsidies
in the no-merger case
s
C(N)
1 =
2(2  2)
	 ()
;
s
C(N)
2 =
(1  )(32   4)
2	 ()
; (7)
where 	 () = 4 + 6   42   43 + 4 > 0 for any  2 (0; 1) :
Hence, we have sC(N)1 > 0 while s
C(N)
2  0 (despite the fact that RC(N)2 (s1) is upward sloping).
Country 1 has an incentive to subsidize production (or exports) of the rm located in its territory,
i.e. rm A, so as to induce a decrease in exports of the competitors located in the other country,
i.e. rms B and C. This is the strategic trade policy motive identied by Brander and Spencer
(1985). This strategic motive is also present in country 2. But this last has also an incentive
to use trade policy to regulate the competition between the rms located on its territory. This
incentive calls for a tax instead of a subsidy and it turns out that this incentive is stronger than
the strategic incentive. In case of homogenous products, i.e.  = 1, the two incentives cancel out
and hence sC(N)2 = 0 as in Huck and Konrad (2004).
This induces the following vector of equilibrium quantities qC(N) = (qC(N)A ; q
C(N)
B ; q
C(N)
C ), with
q
C(N)
A =
(2 + )(2  2)
2	 ()
;
q
C(N)
j =
4  32
2	 ()
; j = B;C: (8)
Finally, equilibrium welfare are thus given by
W
C(N)
1 =
(2 + )(2  2)2(2 +    22)
[2	 ()]2
;
W
C(N)
2 =
(4  32)2(1 +    2)
2 [	 ()]2
: (9)
2.3 Merger in Country 2
Suppose now that there is a national merger in country 2. The rms B and C of country
2 maximize B + C given the subsidy received s2 and given the output level of rm A of
country 1. By symmetry, the two merging rms produce the same quantities but still produce
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di¤erentiated products and hence the best response of any merging rm to the output level qA
is given by rC(M)j (qA; s2) = max f0; (1 + s2   qA) =(2 + 2)g, for j = B;C, where the subscript
C(M) denotes Cournot competition in the Merger case. The best response of rm A located in
country 1 is the same as in the no-merger case, i.e. rC(M)A (q i; s1) = r
C(N)
A (q i; s1). In a word,
with a national merger in country 2, the equilibrium outcome in the second stage of the game is
no longer a triopoly but a duopoly with one rm being a multiproduct rm.
In the absence of regulation  i.e. s1 = s2 = 0  the Cournot equilibrium with product
di¤erentiation yields ~qA = 1= [2 + (2  )] and ~qB = ~qC = (2   )= [2(2 + (2  ))]. This
leads to the following equilibrium prots (and welfare) ~A = 1=

2 + 2   22 and ~B = ~C =
(1 + )(2   )2= 2(2 + 2   2)2. In a completely unregulated economy, a merger is always
protable to the outsider  i.e. rm A and protable to the merging rms only if products
are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated i.e.  < 0:5557 a result rst shown by Lommerud and Sørgard
(1997). The intuition is the following. The merging rms benet from their cooperation but each
looses market shares to the benet of the outsider. However, the more di¤erentiated the products
are, the more limited will be the outsiders increase in export sales as a response to the merger.
Since the outsiders response is harmful to the merging rms, the products must be su¢ ciently
di¤erentiated for the merger to be protable to the participating rms. As shown below, the
results in a strategic trade environment sharply contrast with those of a laisser-faire economy.
Given a couple of subsidies s  (s1; s2) 6= (0; 0), the equilibrium quantities in the second stage
of the game with a national merger in country 2 are given by
q
C(M)
A (s) =
1 + (1 + )s1   s2
2 + 2   2 ;
q
C(M)
j (s) =
(2  ) + 2s2   s1
2(2 + 2   2) ; j = B;C: (10)
Substituting into (1), (3) and (4) and calculating the rst-order conditions for maximizing W1
with respect to s1 and W2 with respect to s2, yields the following best-response functions in
7The computations of the change in each countrys welfare due to the merger in country 2 in a completely un-
regulated economy and in a strategic trade environment both under Cournot competition and Bertrand competition
(leading to the statements in Propositions 1 and 2) are given in the Appendix.
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subsidies
R
C(M)
1 (s2) =
2(1  s2)
2(1 + 2   3) ;
R
C(M)
2 (s1) =
2(2     s1)
4(1 +    2) : (11)
Observe that in contrast with the no-merger case, the best-response function of country 2 is
downward sloping. Intuitively, the merger in country 2 restores the incentives to use trade policy
for strategic reasons only, as in a standard analysis of strategic trade policy à la Brander and
Spencer (1985).
Solving this system of best-response functions, we obtain the following equilibrium subsidies
in the merger case
s
C(M)
1 =
2(2  2)
 ()
;
s
C(M)
2 =
2(2 +    22)
 ()
; (12)
where  () = 4 + 8   22   63 + 4 > 	 () > 0 for any  2 (0; 1).
In contrast to the no-merger case, both countries subsidize their rms. Moreover, comparing
the subsidy rate with and without a merger in country 2, we can establish the following Lemma.
Lemma 1: Under Cournot competition, we have that 0 < sC(M)1 < s
C(N)
1 and s
C(M)
2 > 0 > s
C(N)
2 .
Proof: Decompose the change in subsidy rates induced by a merger into rst-orderand second-
orderadjustment processes as dened just below.8 First, the merging rms internalize the quan-
tity competition among them and hence decrease their production levels i.e. qC(M)j (s) < q
C(N)
j (s)
for j = B;C and for any s  (s1; s2), as one can see from (5) and (10). Therefore, given the couple
of subsidy rates (sC(N)1 ; s
C(N)
2 ), q
C(N) is no longer the equilibrium outcome in the second stage of
the game. But if country 1 maintains unchanged its subsidy rate at sC(N)1 , the vector of output
quantities qC(N) still maximizes country 2s welfare. It follows that this last must accommodate
its subsidy rate and in this case increases its rate above sC(N)2 to induce the merged entity to
8Obviously, these adjustment processes have no descriptive signicance since the analysis is static. We use this
kind of reasoning  inspired from Deneckere and Davidson (1985) but in an analysis of mergers in a completely
unregulated economy as a way to nd the post-merger equilibrium, starting from the pre-merger equilibrium.
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increase the production levels of the two (di¤erentiated) goods. More specically, this increased
subsidy rate ~s2 is such that q
C(M)
j (s
C(N)
1 ; ~s2) = q
C(N)
j (for j = B;C) i.e. using (7), (8) and
(10) ~s2 = (4  32)2= [2	 ()] > 0. But then for country 1, the subsidy rate sC(N)1 is no longer
welfare-maximizing. Hence, if a merger occurs in country 2, country 1 also accommodates its
subsidy rate and in this case decreases its rate below sC(N)1 . Specically, the best response ~s1
of country 1 to a subsidy ~s2 chosen by country 2 is such that ~s1 = R
C(M)
1 (~s2) i.e. using (11)
 ~s1 =

(2 + 3)(2  2)22 = 4(1 + 2   3)	 () < sC(N)1 . Therefore, a merger in country 2
causes two rst-orderadjustments on strategic trade policies: a (positive) subsidy instead of
(positive) tax received by the two merging rms of country 2, and a lower subsidy received by
the rm of country 1. In turn, the policy subsidy of country 2 and the less aggressive behavior of
country 1 causes second-orderadaptations of trade policies. Specically, starting from (~s1; ~s2),
we have successively: (~s1; R
C(M)
2 (~s1)), (R
C(M)
1 (R
C(M)
2 (~s1)); R
C(M)
2 (~s1)), etc. With linear best-
response functions in subsidies, the sequence converges to the unique equilibrium (sC(M)1 ; s
C(M)
2 ).
Hence, country 1 has further decreased its subsidy i.e. sC(M)1 < ~s1 < s
C(N)
1 and country 2 has
further increased its subsidy i.e. sC(M)2 > ~s2 > s
C(N)
2 Q.E.D.
Intuitively, country 1 uses trade subsidy for strategic reasons only, i.e. to induce a decrease in
exports of the rms located in country 2. When there is a merger in country 2 the e¤ectiveness
of trade policy of country 1 is reduced compared to the no-merger case because the two merging
rms internalize their mutual responses to the increase in production of the rm located in coun-
try 1. We indeed have
@qC(M)j (s)=@s1 < @qC(N)j (s)=@s1 for j = B;C, as one can infer directly
from (5) and (10). In other words, for country 1, the marginal social benet of subsidizing its
own rm is lower with a merger in country 2 than in the absence of it. It follows that with a
merger, the subsidy rate maximizing country 1s welfare must be lower than sC(N)1 . In country
2, a national merger removes the incentive to regulate the competition between the two rms.
What remains is the strategic trade incentive. This leads this country to subsidize its rms at a
positive rate, which is actually greater than that of country 1 (i.e. sC(M)2 > s
C(M)
1 > 0).
We can now determine the vector of equilibrium quantities qC(M) = (qC(M)A ; q
C(M)
B ; q
C(M)
C ) in
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case of a merger in country 2. We have
q
C(M)
A =
(1 + )(2  2)
 ()
;
q
C(M)
j =
2 +    22
 ()
; j = B;C: (13)
Equilibrium welfare with a national merger are thus given by
W
C(M)
1 =
(1 + )(2  2)2(1 +    2)
[ ()]2
;
W
C(M)
2 =
2(2 +    22)2(1 +    2)
[ ()]2
: (14)
2.4 The protability of a domestic merger
Calculating for each country the welfare di¤erence when the two rms of country 2 merge and
when they do not yields the following result.
Proposition 1: Under Cournot competition, a national merger in country 2 is always protable
for country 2 and protable for country 1 if  < 0:556.
Proof: Decompose the change in welfare induced by the merger in country 2 into two components:
the price e¤ect and the quantity e¤ect. First, as shown by Lemma 1, the merger in country 2 leads
to a lower subsidy for rm A (located in country 1), which in turn induces a lower production (or
export) level, i.e. qC(M)A < q
C(N)
A . Specically, letting 
C(qj)  qC(M)j   qC(N)j (for j = A;B;C)
and using (8) and (13), we have for rm A
C(qA) =  
3(2  2)(2 + 2   2)
2	 ()  ()
< 0: (15)
In country 2, with the merger, rms B and C receive a positive subsidy instead of being taxed.
The merger then leads to an increase in the production (or export) level of each merging rm,
i.e. qC(M)j > q
C(N)
j for j = B;C. Still using (8) and (13), the di¤erence in production levels for
j = B;C is given by
C(qj) =
4(2  2)
2	 ()  ()
> 0: (16)
One can observe that
C(qA)  2C(qj). Hence, the decrease in the production of rm A is
greater (in absolute value) than the increase in production of both rms B and C. Intuitively,
compared to the pre-merger situation, the increase in production of rms B and C results only
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from the second-orderadaptations of trade policies as dened in the proof of Lemma 1. The
decrease in production of rm A is much more pronounced because it results both from the rst-
orderand second-orderadaptations in trade policies (see again the proof of Lemma 1). It follows
that the price of each of the three products increases. Let C(pj)  pj
 
qC(M)
  pj  qC(N) for
j = A;B;C. From (1), we indeed have C(pA) =  (C(qA) + 2C(qj)) (for j = B or j = C),
i.e.,
C(pA) =
 
2 + 2   32 =C(qj) > 0; (17)
and C(pj) =  (C(qA) + (1 + )C(qj)) (for j = B or j = C), i.e.,
C(pj) =
 
1 +    2C(qj) > 0: (18)
Thus, a national merger in country 2 increases both export quantities and export prices of the
two rms involved in the merger. Country 20s welfare that is the value of domestic exports is
thus necessarily higher in the merger case.
Country 1 benets from an increase of its export price but su¤er from a decrease of its export
quantities. Therefore, country 1s welfare might be higher or lower in the merger case depending
on the extent of product di¤erentiation parameterized by . First, recall that in the pre-merger
situation the equilibrium subsidy rates are given by the couple (sC(N)1 ; s
C(N)
2 ), which results in
the vector of equilibrium quantities qC(N). By denition, at this equilibrium point, the marginal
social benet of subsidizing its own rm for country 1 is nil. In the post-merger situation,
and as discussed in the Proof of Lemma 1, the same vector of quantities qC(N) could still be
implemented with the couple of subsidies (sC(N)1 ; ~s2) with ~s2 > s
C(N)
2 . But a merger in country 2
reduces the e¤ectiveness of the trade policy of country 1 i.e.
@qC(M)j (s)=@s1 < @qC(N)j (s)=@s1
for j = B;C. This leads country 1 to reduce the subsidy to its rm up to ~s1  such that
~s1 = R
C(M)
1 (~s2) which necessarily increases country 1s welfare. In other words, a lower subsidy
received by rm A leads to lower export quantities and to a greater export price, this last e¤ect
being larger than the former in terms of welfare change. However, the merger also causes second-
orderadaptations in governmentspolicies and this is the source of the negative impact of the
merger on country 1s welfare. Specically, from (~s1; ~s2), there is a further decrease of the
subsidy in country 1  i.e. sC(M)1 < ~s1 and a further increase of the subsidy in country 2 
i.e. sC(M)2 > ~s2. Country 2 then registers a further increase in exports and country 1 registers
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a further decrease in exports, especially if products are close substitutes. If however products
are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated, then the negative e¤ect due to the second-orderadaptations in
governmentspolicies does not o¤set the positive e¤ect resulting from the rst-orderadaptation
in country 1s policy (and so this country registers an increase in welfare) Q.E.D.
Hence, in a strategic trade policy environment, a merger is always protable to the country of
origin while in a completely unregulated world economy as in Lommerud and Sørgard (1997)
it is protable to the rms (and therefore to the country) only if products are not very close
substitutes (that is if  < 0:555). Our result that country 2 always benet from the merger of
its rms extends that of Huck and Konrad (2004) in a similar model but with a homogenous
good. The di¤erence is that the merger can also be benecial to the other country if products
are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated (that is if  < 0:5569). In any case, as specied in the Appendix,
the country in which the merger occurs benets more from it than the other country.
Intuitively, a merger between rms B and C increases country 2s welfare since this allows it
to use trade policy for one objective only (instead of two), that is shifting prots from the foreign
rm to the domestic rms. The merger in country 2 may also increase country 1s welfare. The
intuition is that a merger in country 2 causes country 1 to reduce its export subsidy. This in
turn improves its terms of trade but decreases the market share of its rm (to the benet of the
merged entity). When products are close substitutes, the export sales of rms B and C have
a strong negative impact on those of rm A, and so a merger in country 2 causes welfare in
country 1 to decrease. This is especially true for the case of homogenous products (as in Huck
and Konrad, 2004). If however products are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated, the increase in export
sales of the merging rms has a limited impact on the market share of rm A, and so country 1s
welfare increases with the merger (in country 2) because of the terms of trade improvement.
3 Bertrand Competition
3.1 The Basic Framework
From (1) we can write direct demand function for product i for i = A;B;C,
9Surprisingly enough, this threshold value is very similar to that below which a merger is protable to the
insiders in a completely unregulated economy.
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qi (p) =
(1  )  (1 + )pi + p i
(1  )(1 + 2) ; (19)
where p  (pA; pB; pC), and where p i is the sum of price levels excluding that of rm i.
The prot of rm i located in country j thus paying the tax tj10 is thus given by
i = (pi   tj)qi (p) ; (20)
Welfare in country 1 is given by W1 = A + t1qA (p), or
W1 = pAqA (p) : (21)
Welfare in country 2 is given by W2 = B + C + t2(qB (p) + qC (p)), or
W2 = pBqB (p) + pCqC (p) : (22)
Again, tax payments net out in the equation determining a countrys welfare, and we will focus
precisely on the change in welfare in both countries induced by the merger in country 2.
3.2 The No-merger case
The best response of rm i located in country j thus paying the tax tj to the sum of price
levels p i is given by r
B(N)
i (p i; tj) = [(1  ) + (1 + )tj + p i] = [2(1 + )], where the subscript
B(N) denotes Bertrand competition in the No-merger case. In the absence of regulation i.e.
t1 = t2 = 0  the Bertrand equilibrium with product di¤erentiation yields pi = (1   )=2 for
i = A;B;C. This leads to the following equilibrium prots (and welfare), i = (1  2)=(4 + 8)
for i = A;B;C.
Given a couple of tax rates t  (t1; t2) 6= (0; 0), the equilibrium prices in the second stage of
the game in the absence of a merger are given by
p
B(N)
A (t) =
(1  )(2 + 3) + (2 + 3 + 2)t1 + 2(1 + )t2
2(2 + 3)
;
p
B(N)
j (t) =
(1  )(2 + 3) + 2(1 + )2t2 + (1 + )t1
2(2 + 3)
; j = B;C: (23)
10 In a standard model of strategic trade policy, a positive subsidy is used under Cournot behavior, while a
positive tax is indicated when rms engage in Bertrand competition (see Eaton and Grossman, 1986). Therefore,
to make the analysis more suitable, we now view trade policy as an export tax.
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Substituting into (19), (21) and (22), calculating the rst-order conditions for maximizing W1
with respect to t1 and W2 with respect to t2, yields the following best-response functions in tax
rates
R
B(N)
1 (t2) =
2

2 +    32 + 2(1 + )t2

(1 + )(2 + )(2 + 3   2) ;
R
B(N)
2 (t1) =
(1 + 2)

2 +    32 + (1 + )t1

4(1 + )2(1 +    2) : (24)
Best-response functions in tax rates are upward sloping as it is typically the case in a Bertrand
oligopoly model of international trade à la Eaton and Grossman (1986). However, one can easily
verify that the slope of the best-response function of country 2 is steeper than that of country
1, i.e. @RB(N)2 (t1)=@t1 > @R
B(N)
1 (t2)=@t2. When country 1 increases its tax rate by dt1, rm A
raises its price, which in turn induces rms B and C to also raise their prices (see eq. (23)).
But again, in the no-merger case, the two rms of country 2 act independently of each other.
Hence, in order to induce each of its rms to take into account the positive spillover of ones own
increase in price on one partners marginal prot, country 2 best reacts to an increase in tax rate
in country 1 by further increasing its own tax rate. This is because an increase in tax rate causes
the marginal prot in price to raise. In other words, and in contrast to Cournot competition, the
incentive to make domestic rms acting as if they were a single but multiproduct rm plays
in the same direction than the strategic trade incentive.
Solving this system of best-response functions, we obtain the following equilibrium tax rates
in the no-merger case
t
B(N)
1 =
2(1  )(2 + 4 + 2)
(1 + ) ()
;
t
B(N)
2 =
(1  )(1 + 2)(4 + 8 + 2)
2(1 + ) ()
; (25)
where  () = 4 + 10 + 22   63   4 > 0 for any  2 (0; 1).
Hence, we have tB(N)2 > t
B(N)
1 > 0. Country 1 has an incentive to tax production (or exports)
of the rm located in its territory, i.e. rm A, so as to induce an increase in its price and,
consequently, an increase in the prices settled by its competitors located in the other country, i.e.
rms B and C. This is the strategic trade policy motive identied by Eaton and Grossman (1986)
for Bertrand competition. This strategic motive is also present in country 2. But, this last has
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also an incentive to use trade policy to lead its rms to internalize the strategic complementarity
in prices between them, thus leading to a greater tax rate than in country 1 (i.e. tB(N)2 > t
B(N)
1 ).
This induces the following vector of prices pB(N) = (pC(N)A ; p
C(N)
B ; p
C(N)
C ), with
p
B(N)
A =
(1  )(2 + )(2 + 4 + 2)
2 ()
;
p
B(N)
j =
(1  2)(4 + 8 + 2)
2 ()
; j = B;C: (26)
Equilibrium welfare are given by
W
B(N)
1 =
(1  )(2 + )(2 + 3   2)(2 + 4 + 2)2
4(1 + 2) [ ()]2
;
W
B(N)
2 =
(1  2)(1 +    2)(4 + 8 + 2)2
2(1 + 2) [ ()]2
: (27)
3.3 Merger in Country 2
With a national merger in country 2, rms B and C maximize B+C given the tax paid t2 and
given the price level of rm A of country 1. By symmetry, the two merging rms chose the same
price for their respective products and hence the best response of any merging rm to the price
level pA is given by r
B(M)
j (pA; t2) = [1 +t2+pA]=2, for j = B;C, whereB(M) denotesBertrand
competition in the Merger case. The best response of rm A is the same as in the no-merger
case, i.e. rB(M)A (p A; t1) = r
B(N)
A (p A; t1). In the absence of regulation i.e. t1 = t2 = 0 the
Bertrand equilibrium with product di¤erentiation yields p^A = (1 2)=(2+2 2) and p^B = p^C =
(2 +    32)= 2(2 + 2   2). This yields the following equilibrium prots (and welfare) ^A =
(1 )(1+)3= (1 + 2)(2 + 2   2)2 and ^B = ^C = (1 )(2+3)2= 4(1 + 2)(2 + 2   2)2.
In a completely unregulated economy with Bertrand competition, a merger is always protable
to the merging rms and it is even more so for the outsider, a result rst shown by Deneckere and
Davidson (1985) in a model with N rms. The key argument for this result is that rmsbest-
response functions are upward sloping. Our reading of their analysis is that a merger (without
government intervention) has the same e¤ect than a unilateral tax policy undertaken by one
county in a strategic trade environment à la Eaton and Grossman (1986).
Given a couple of taxes t  (t1; t2), the equilibrium prices in the second stage of the game,
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with a national merger in country 2, are given by
p
B(M)
A (t) =
1  2 + t1(1 + ) + t2
2 + 2   2 ;
p
B(M)
j (t) =
(1  )(2 + 3) + (1 + ) (t1 + 2t2)
2(2 + 2   2) ; j = B;C: (28)
Substituting into (19), (21) and (22), calculating the rst-order conditions for maximizing W1
with respect to t1 and W2 with respect to t2, yields the following best-response functions in tax
rates
R
B(M)
1 (t2) =
2

1  2 + t2

2(1 + 2   3) ;
R
B(M)
2 (t1) =
2 [(1  )(2 + 3) + (1 + )t1]
4(1 + 2   3) : (29)
Solving this system of best-response functions, we obtain the following equilibrium tax rates in
the merger case
t
B(M)
1 =
2(1  )(2 + 4 + 2)
(1 + ) ()
;
t
B(M)
2 =
2(1  )(2 + 3   2)
 ()
; (30)
where  (), dened in the previous section, is positive.
Comparing the tax rates with and without a merger in country 2, we can establish the fol-
lowing Lemma.
Lemma 2: Under Bertrand competition, we have that tB(M)1 > t
B(N)
1 > 0 and t
B(N)
2 > t
B(M)
2 > 0.
Proof: Again, decompose the change in tax rates induced by a merger in country 2 into
rst-orderand second-orderadjustment processes as dened just below. First, the merging
rms internalize the price competition among them and hence increase their price levels  i.e.
p
B(M)
j (t) > p
B(N)
j (t) for j = B;C and for any t  (t1; t2), as it can be veried from (23) and (28).
Therefore, given the couple of subsidy rates (tB(N)1 ; t
B(N)
2 ), p
B(N) is no longer the equilibrium
outcome in the second stage of the game. But if country 1 maintains unchanged its tax rate at
t
B(N)
1 , the vector of prices p
B(N) still maximizes country 2s welfare. It follows that this last must
accommodate its tax rate and in this case must decrease its rate below tB(N)2 to induce the
merged entity to decrease the price of each of the two (di¤erentiated) goods. More specically,
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this lower tax rate ~t2 is such that p
B(M)
j (t
B(N)
1 ; ~t2) = p
B(N)
j (for j = B;C) i.e. using (25), (26)
and (28)  ~t2 = 2(1   )(4 + 8 + 2)= [2 ()] < tB(N)2 . But then for country 1, the tax rate
t
B(N)
1 is no longer welfare-maximizing. Hence, if a merger occurs in country 2, country 1 also
accommodates its tax rate and in this case must increase its rate above tB(N)1 . More specically,
the best response ~t1 of country 1 to a tax rate ~t2 chosen by country 2 is such that ~t1 = R
B(M)
1 (~t2)
i.e. using (29) ~t1 = 2(2   3 + 2)(2 + 4 + 2)2=

4(1 + 2   3) () > tB(N)1 . Therefore,
a merger in country 2 causes two rst-orderadjustments on strategic trade policies: a decrease
in taxes paid by the two merging rms of country 2 and an increase in taxes paid by the rm
of country 1. In turn, the more aggressive tax policy of country 1 and the less aggressive policy
of country 2 cause second-order adjustment processes of trade policies. Specically, starting
from
 
~t1; ~t2

, we have successively: (~t1; R
B(M)
2 (~t1)), (R
B(M)
1 (R
B(M)
2 (~t1)); R
B(M)
2 (~t1)), etc. With
linear best-response functions in tax rates, the sequence converges to the unique equilibrium
(t
B(M)
1 ; t
B(M)
2 ). Hence, country 1 has further increased its tax rate  i.e. t
B(M)
1 > ~t1 > t
B(N)
1 
and country 2 has also increased its tax rate i.e. tB(M)2 > ~t2 but this does not compensate the
decrease due to the rst-orderadjustment, so that ~t2 < t
B(M)
2 < t
B(N)
2 Q.E.D.
Intuitively, country 1 uses tax policy to shift the best-response function of its rm upwards to
higher price levels in order to induce an increase in the prices settled by the rms located in
country 2. When there is a merger in country 2, the e¤ectiveness of the trade policy of country
1 is increased compared to the no-merger case because the two merging rms internalize their
mutual responses to the increase in price of the rm located in country 1. We indeed have
@p
B(M)
j (t) =@t1 > @p
B(N)
j (t)=@t1 for j = B;C, as one can infer from (23) and (28). In other
words, with a merger in country 2, the marginal social benet of taxing its own rm is higher
for country 1 than in the absence of a merger in the other country. It follows that the tax rate
maximizing country 1s welfare when a merger occurs in country 2 must be higher than tB(N)1 . In
country 2, a national merger removes the incentive to use tax policy to internalize the strategic
complementarity in price setting between the two domestic rms. There only remains the strate-
gic trade incentive, so that this country still taxes the exports of its rms but at a lower rate
than in the pre-merger situation.
Let pB(M) =

p
B(M)
A ; p
B(M)
B ; p
B(M)
C

be the vector of equilibrium prices in case of a merger in
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country 2. We have
p
B(M)
A =
(1  )(2 + 4 + 2)
 ()
;
p
B(M)
j =
(1  2)(2 + 3   2)
 ()
; j = B;C: (31)
Equilibrium welfare with a national merger in country 2 are thus given by
W
B(M)
1 =
(1  )(1 +    2)(2 + 4 + 2)2
(1 + 2) [ ()]2
;
W
B(M)
2 =
2(1  2)(1 +    2)(2 + 3   2)2
(1 + 2) [ ()]2
: (32)
3.4 The protability of a domestic merger
Calculating for each country the welfare di¤erence when the two rms of country 2 merge and
when they do not yields the following result.
Proposition 2: Under Bertrand competition, a national merger in country 2 is protable to both
countries independently of  2 (0; 1).
Proof: Again, decompose the change in welfare induced by the merger in country 2 into two
components: the price e¤ect and the quantity e¤ect. First, as shown by Lemma 2, the merger in
country 2 leads to a higher tax rate for rm A (located in country 1), which in turn induces a
greater export price for this rm, i.e. pB(M)A > p
B(N)
A . Specically, letting 
B(pj)  pB(M)j  pB(N)j
(for j = A;B;C) and using (26) and (31), we indeed have for rm A
B(pA) =
3(1  )(2 + 2   2)(2 + 4 + 2)
2 () : ()
> 0: (33)
With respect to rms B and C of country 2, they pay lower taxes after the merger, which would
induce them to set lower export prices. But, as shown just above, the merger also leads rm A
to set a higher export price because of the increased tax burden. Best-response functions being
upward sloping, this provides incentives for rms B and C to raise their prices and this incentive
is stronger than that due to the decrease in domestic tax rate. Indeed, the best-response function
of each rm B and C is shifted towards higher prices because each merging rm now takes into
account the impact of ones own increase in price on the marginal prot of its partner. As a
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result, the export price of each merging rm j (for j = B;C) is greater with the merger than in
the absence of it, i.e.,
B(pj) =
4(1  2)(2 + 4 + 2)
2 () : ()
> 0: (34)
Note that B(pA) > B(pj) since this inequality is veried if 3(1  )(2 + 2  2) > 4(1  2),
which reduced to 2(1  2) +  > 0, this last being veried for any  2 (0; 1).
With respect to the export quantities, let B(qj)  qj
 
pB(M)
  qj  pB(N) for j = A;B;C.
From (19), we have B(qA) =
 (1 + )B(pA) + 2B(pj) = [(1  )(1 + 2)] (for j = B or
j = C), i.e.,
B(qA) =  (2 + 2   3
2)B(pj)
(1 +    22) < 0; (35)
and B(qj) =
h
 Bj (pj) + BA(pA)
i
= [(1  )(1 + 2)] (for j = B;C), i.e.,
B(qj) =
(1 +    2)B(pj)
(1  2)(1 + 2) > 0: (36)
Thus, a merger in country 2 increases both export quantities and export prices of the two rms
involved in the merger. Country 20s welfare  that is the value of domestic exports  is thus
necessarily higher in the merger case. Country 1 benets from an increase in its export price
but su¤er from a decrease in its export quantities. However, the impact of the change in price is
greater than that of the change in quantity for any value of  2 (0; 1), so that a merger in country
2 also raises country 1s welfare. This can be understood as follows. Country 1s welfare would
be the same in the post- and pre-merger situation if tax rates where set at (tB(N)1 ; ~t2) leading
to pB(N) (see the proof of Lemma 2). However, the vector of equilibrium prices is now pB(M),
which corresponds to the following (equilibrium) tax rates tB(M)1 > t
B(N)
1 and t
B(M)
2 > ~t2. Then
starting from pB(N), country 1s welfare raises for two reasons: an increase in the tax rate of
country 2 (above ~t2), and an increase in its own tax rate due to the greater e¤ectiveness of its
strategic trade policy Q.E.D.
With a merger between rms B and C, country 2 does no longer need to use tax policy to
internalize the positive externality in price-setting between the two domestic rms. There only
remains the strategic trade incentive so that the tax rate for rms B and C is lower than in the
pre-merger situation. The merger in country 2 also reinforces the e¤ectiveness of the strategic
trade policy of country 1, thus leading this last to set a higher tax rate. Overall, these changes
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in tax rates result in higher prices for each of the three products. As a result, unlike Cournot
competition, a merger in country 2 benets both countries independently of the degree of product
di¤erentiation.
It is interesting to note that with a merger in country 2, rm A raises its price more than
rms B and C do. Hence, by gross substitutability, these changes in prices shift market shares
from the outsider to the insiders so that country 2 benets more from the merger than country
1, as it is specied in the Appendix. In a completely unregulated world, the reverse holds in that
the merger is more protable to the outsider(s) than to the insiders (Deneckere and Davidson,
1985).
4 Conclusion
We have analyzed the protability of mergers in a strategic trade policy environment both in
quantity-setting and price setting games. We show that, under Cournot competition, a domestic
merger is always protable to the host country. It is also protable to the other country, provided
rms produce su¢ ciently di¤erentiated products. These results strongly contrast with those
obtained in a laisser-faire economy, and also extend the previous work of Huck and Konrad
(2004) who consider the case of Cournot competition and homogenous products. The results are
reinforced under Bertrand competition in that a domestic merger is protable to both countries
irrespective of the degree of substitutability between the goods.
It should be pointed out that we made the simplest assumptions about cost and demand, and
about the number of countries and rms. Nonetheless, the analysis of the impact of mergers in
a strategic trade environment with di¤erentiated products proved that mergers cause intricate
e¤ects on governmentsincentives. One might expect that these e¤ects will carry over to more
general functional forms and to larger number of rms and countries. Yet, a more systematic
examination of the general conditions under which a domestic merger is protable to all partners
should be carried out.
Finally, our analysis could also be extended to address the protability of international mergers
and this would raise the question of the international ownership structure after the merger(s).
For example, Huck and Konrad (2004) assumes full indigenizationof the merged entity, which
means that the rm that exists after the merger is nationally owned (in the same way as for
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national mergers). This assumption is reasonable in a context where products are homogenous
(and where the marginal cost of production is constant) because a merger between two rms is
analytically equivalent to the closing down of one of the merging rm. With a xed number
of di¤erentiated products, an international merger might very well result in a situation where
for example the two merging rms belong to two di¤erent countries and therefore are subject
to di¤erent policies. If it is the case, the country hosting one of the merging rm and the rm
outside the merger may also nd protable to di¤erentiate its trade policy towards the two rms.
Clearly, more research on the protability of mergers in a strategic trade policy environment is
needed.
5 Appendix
5.1 Cournot Competition
In the absence of regulation, the di¤erence in prots (or welfare) for country 1 with and without
a merger in country 2 is
~A  A =
2(4 + 4   2)
2(1 + )(2 + 2   2)2 > 0: (A1)
The di¤erence in joint prot (or welfare) for country 2 when rms B and C merge and when they
do not i.e. ()  (~B + ~C)  (B + C) is given by
() =
2

1     22 + 3
2(1 + )2

2 + 2   22 ; (A2)
which is positive for  > 0:555.
In a strategic trade environment, the welfare di¤erence when the two rms of country 2 merge
and when they do not, is given by C(Wi) WC(M)i  WC(N)i . For country 1, we then have
C(W1) =
6(2  2)2 1 ()
[2	 () : ()]2
; (A3)
where  1 () = 4  162 + 114   25 > (<)0 for  < (>)0:556.
For country 2, we have
C(W2) =
4(2  2)(1 +    2) 2 ()
2 [	 () : ()]2
> 0; (A4)
where  2 () = 32 + 64   402   963 + 224 + 365   76 > 0 for any  2 (0; 1).
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We also have
C(W2)
W
C(N)
2
  
C(W1)
W
C(N)
1
=
44(4  42 + 3) [	 ()]2
(4 + 4   32   23) (4  32) ()2 > 0: (A5)
In other words, the rate of increase in welfare in country 2 is larger than that of country 1.
5.2 Betrand Competition
In the absence of regulation, the di¤erence in prots (or welfare) for country 1 with and without
a merger in country 2 is
^A   A = 
2(1  2)(4 + 4   2)
4(1 + 2)(2 + 2   2)2 > 0: (A6)
The di¤erence in joint prot (or welfare) for country 2 when rms B and C merge and when they
do not i.e.  ()  (^B + ^C)  (B + C) is given by
 () =
2(1  )[1 + 4 + 32   3]
2(1 + 2)(2 + 2   2)2 > 0: (A7)
Hence, a merger is protable to both the insiders and the outsider.
In a strategic trade environment, the welfare di¤erence when the two rms of country 2 merge
and when they do not, is given by B(Wi) WB(M)i  WB(N)i . For country 1, we then have
B(W1) =
6(1  )(2 + 4 + 2)21 ()
4(1 + 2) [ () : ()]2
> 0; (A8)
where 1 () = 4 + 20 + 24
2   83   174 + 5 > 0 for any  2 (0; 1).
For country 2 we have
B(W2) =
4(1  2)(1 +    2)(2 + 4 + 2)2 ()
2(1 + 2) [ () : ()]2
> 0; (A9)
where 2 () = 32 + 128 + 120
2   643   904 + 85 + 36 > 0 for any  2 (0; 1).
We also have
B(W2)
W
B(N)
2
  
B(W1)
W
B(N)
1
=
44(4 + 12 + 82   3) [ ()]2
(4 + 8 + 2   3) (4 + 8 + 2) ()2 > 0: (A10)
Again, the rate of increase in welfare in country 2 is larger than that of country 1.
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